This paper investigates the effect of daily management of Federal Reserve accounts by U.S. depository institutions on the interest rate outside the U.S. Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988) , Griffiths and Winters (1995) and Hamilton (1996) found that the Fed funds rate exhibited calendar day effects caused by Federal Reserve regulations. I find that the overnight Eurodollar rate shows similar predictable daily changes as does the Federal funds rate although the absolute magnitudes are slightly less. The empirical results support the hypothesis that the tendencies in daily changes in the two overnight interest rates are caused by the characteristics of the Fed funds market.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of daily management of Federal Reserve accounts by U.S. depository institutions on interest rates outside the U.S.
Previous research (Campbell (1987) , Saunders and Urich (1988) , Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988) , Griffiths and Winters (1995) and Hamilton (1996) ) showed predictable patterns in the Fed funds rate caused by Federal Reserve regulations. Hamilton (1996) found that over the period [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] the Fed funds rate tended to fall during the reserve maintenance period until the second Friday, decrease on Fridays and before U.S. holidays but increase on Mondays and surge upwards on settlement Wednesdays and after holidays. The variance of the Fed funds rate increased toward the end of a settlement period and was highest on settlement Wednesdays. These results are similar to the findings of Griffiths and Winters (1995) . These authors claim that these features are the result of reserve requirements and the characteristics of the Fed funds market.
To explore the relationships between external (Eurocurrency or offshore) and internal (domestic) money market interest rates, previous research studied the Grangercausality between Eurodollar rates and U.S. domestic interest rates on compatible assets. Reinhart and Harmon (1987) examined the relationship between the daily Fed funds rate and the daily overnight Eurodollar rate. They studied the effect of the switch from nextday settlement to same-day settlement for Eurodollar deposits in October 1981. They showed that this change caused a structural shift in the causal relationship between the two markets. They argued that the Fed funds rate was not Granger-caused by the overnight Eurodollar rate but the overnight Eurodollar rate was Granger-caused by the Fed funds rate during the next-day settlement period. The overnight Eurodollar rate and the Fed funds rate Granger-caused each other during the same-day settlement period.
Other early studies (Hendershott, 1967; Kwack, 1971; Levin 1974; and Kaen and Hachey, 1983) showed that U.S. interest rates were not Granger-caused by Eurodollar rates but Eurodollar rates were Granger-caused by U.S. domestic interest rates. However, more recent studies (Fung and Isberg, 1992; Fung and Lo, 1995) found that Eurodollar rates and U.S. domestic interest rates Granger-caused each other after the middle of the 1980s, with weaker feedback from Eurodollar rates to U.S. domestic interest rates. These results are used as indicators of whether interest rate innovations originated primarily in the U.S. market or in the Eurodollar market. However, the Eurodollar and U.S. domestic interest rates are, in general, measured at different times within the same day so it is hard to interpret their results as a Granger-causality test. Yesterday's Fed funds rate, for example, reflects more recent information than yesterday's Eurodollar rates in London and, therefore, should help forecast today's Eurodollar rate regardless of the direction of causation.
This paper analyzes the Fed funds rate and the overnight Eurodollar rate between 1984 and 1997 to examine the pervasiveness of Federal Reserve Board regulations governing required reserves in the money market outside the U.S. The main focus is to see whether the overnight Eurodollar rate showed the same calendar day effects as the Federal funds rate. In contrast to previous research on the Eurodollar rate, this study allows for outliers and GARCH effects. The overnight Eurodollar rate exhibits very similar calendar day effects as the Fed funds rate, but the absolute magnitudes are slightly smaller. These results support the hypothesis that the calendar day effects of the Federal funds rate and the overnight Eurodollar rate are created by Federal Reserve regulations of the reserve settlement process and the characteristics of the Fed funds market. The differential between the Fed funds rate and the overnight Eurodollar rate is predictable and positively serially correlated. A U.S. bank could have made a small arbitrage profit by using the predictability of the differential between two overnight interest rates. This small arbitrage opportunity indicates that factors other than interest rates have prevented perfect market integration of the Fed funds market with the overnight Eurodollar market.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the institutional details and characteristics of the Eurodollar market and the Fed funds market in the U.S. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 develops the empirical setting. The empirical results are reported in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
The Eurodollar Market and the Federal Funds Market
A U.S. bank or other depository institution has to satisfy reserve requirements, the percentage of deposits that they may not lend out or invest, which must be held either as vault cash or on deposit at a Federal Reserve Bank. To get desired reserves, a bank has several options. It can purchase (sell) Federal funds, borrow from the Fed through the discount window, sell (buy) Eurodollars, sell (buy) securities under repurchase agreements (reverse repurchase agreements) or sell (buy) large certificates of deposit.
Eurodollars are U.S. dollar-denominated deposit liabilities of the Eurodollar market, which is an international telephone and telex network located in many countries outside the U.S. The Eurodollar market is a wholesale market. Commercial and central banks, large corporations, and governments are the major customers. However, banks that participate in the Eurodollar market actively borrow and lend Eurodollars among themselves and interbank transactions alone have made up over 60 percent of the total volume of transactions over the 1980s and 1990s.
The Federal funds market is the interbank market for overnight lending of funds on deposit in a bank's reserve account at the Fed. Most Fed funds transactions are overnight loans between two depository institutions. It has been primarily made up of domestic commercial banks, thrift institutions, agencies and branches of foreign banks, Federal agencies, and government securities dealers in the U.S. The Federal Reserve does not pay interest on reserve accounts so banks have an incentive to minimize balances and to lend beyond their required (or desired) excess reserves.
To satisfy the reserve requirements, the average daily level of reserves during the two-week maintenance period must equal or exceed the average required reserves during the two-week computation period. Panels A, B and C of Figure 1 indicate the reserve accounting system from 1984 to 1998. Since 1984, the maintenance period over which reserves must be held is a two-week period beginning on a Thursday and ending on a Wednesday. The last Wednesday of the maintenance period is called settlement Wednesday. The computation period is a two-week period for computing the average required reserves on the basis of daily average balances of deposits. Reserves required against transaction deposits are computed against the average end-of-day transaction deposits at the bank during the computation period. The computation period against transaction deposits began on a Tuesday and ended on a Monday two days before the end of the reserve maintenance period. The computation period was amended in July 1998
and since then it has ended three days before the beginning of the maintenance period.
For required reserves against nontransaction deposits, the computation period was also a two-week period ending two weeks prior to the beginning of the reserve computation period for transaction deposits until 1990. To calculate a bank's average reserves, the Fed added the average of a bank's deposit at the Federal Reserve during the reserve maintenance period to the average daily vault cash during a two-week period as shown in Figure 1 . The total deposits are calculated by adding deposits for each calendar day over the computation period. The deposits on Friday are multiplied by three or, if the next Monday is a one-day holiday, multiplied by four, as directed by the weekend accounting conventions. A bank did not know the amount of reserve requirements against transaction deposits and the amount of reserve balances at the Fed until late in the maintenance period. Therefore, the bank needed to estimate them within the maintenance period until July 1998. A U.S. bank could vary the amount of its reserves to meet the reserve requirements on the settlement Wednesday when information on actual deposits was available and, therefore, the settlement Wednesday was very important to all banks.
Transaction deposits had been subject to the 3 percent reserve requirement for the first $25-50 million and 12 percent for amounts exceeding this during the period from 1984 to 1997. U.S. banks had been required to keep 3 percent reserves on Eurocurrency borrowing in excess of their funds abroad. It was changed to 0 percent in 1990.
Because Fed funds and Eurodollars transactions are usually unsecured by anything other than verbal agreements, a bank limits the size of transactions for each buyer to minimize the seller's exposure to default risk. A bank with poor credit might be unable to buy Federal funds or Eurodollars.
The Fed funds market has wide access to all banks. The top Fed funds brokers also broker Eurodollars and speak to a wide range of banks including the majority of the large and medium-sized banks. The characteristics of dollar-denominated assets and liabilities in the Fed funds market and the overnight Eurodollar market are nearly identical and the two overnight funds could be close substitutes.
Description of Data
The data set used in this study consists of the daily Fed funds rate and the daily overnight Eurodollar rate, quoted at an annual rate and provided by the Federal Reserve Board. For the Fed funds rate, I use the effective Federal funds rate, which is a weighted average of the funds rates that prevailed during the day, where the weights used are the amount of funds that are traded at each of the funds rates that prevailed. The overnight Eurodollar best deposit rate in London between 12:00 am and 1:00 pm Greenwich Mean 
Model Specification
Both overnight Eurodollars and Fed funds are U.S. dollar-denominated and traded in large amounts for one business day. Therefore, the Fed funds rate and the overnight Eurodollar rate are comparable, and the differential between the two interest rates is not 8 involved with the term structure of interest rates or the capital gain on foreign currency.
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These two rates are related by the following identity: 
where
is the conditional expectation operator with respect to the information set
Reserves held on any day of the two-week maintenance period are perfect substitutes for the purpose of meeting reserve requirements. The Federal funds rate would follow a martingale within a two-week maintenance period under the following conditions: banks are risk neutral; the reserve requirements are the only reason why banks hold reserves; and there is no friction to participate in the Fed funds market (Hamilton, 1996) . Hamilton (1996) Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988) and Griffiths and Winters (1995) found similar results. Hamilton (1996) explained these tendencies as the result of line limits, transaction costs and reserve accounting conventions in the Federal funds market.
First, the line limits caused the Fed funds rate to fall during the reserve maintenance period until the second Friday. A bank wanted to borrow early in the maintenance period to avoid a risk of running up against line limits even if it knew the Fed funds rate would be cheaper later on in the maintenance period. Second, the Fed funds rate tended to drop on Fridays and before holidays and increased on Mondays and after holidays. The banks wanted to supply weekend funds, in order to earn 3 days' worth of interest. Furthermore, since a bank did not want unneeded excess reserves and it was not sure whether it needed the full reserve credit it could obtain from a multiple day loan (such as a two-day loan, a three-day loan or a four-day loan), it preferred not to borrow such a loan. Third, the Fed funds rate tended to rise at the end of the maintenance period. Since a bank could perceive more information on needed reserves on settlement Wednesdays due to the reserve accounting system, it delayed its borrowing until then to avoid unneeded reserves.
Another factor to deviate from the martingale hypothesis is that overnight overdraft penalties limit the willingness of banks to substitute reserve holdings across the days of the maintenance period. Hamilton (1996) also noted that the martingale hypothesis might not restrict the Wednesday-Thursday change across different maintenance periods. This is because reserves on the first Thursday of a maintenance period are not perfectly substitutable for reserves of the day before, even though there is a provision allowing banks to substitute some amount of reserves across maintenance periods.
I extend Hamilton's (1996) model for the Fed funds rate and add lagged overnight Eurodollar rates to the explanatory variables. Many researchers found changes in interest rates on money market instruments as the last day of a quarter approached, which is called the turn-of-the-quarter effect. Popular explanations are window dressing (Allen and Saunders, 1992; Musto, 1997) and preferred habitat for liquidity (Ogden,1987; Griffiths and Winters, 1997) . Therefore, the Fed funds rate was also allowed to deviate from the martingale hypothesis on the last day of a quarter and the quarter-end effects on the Fed fund rate or the overnight Eurodollar rate are not interpreted as a calendar day effect created by Federal Reserve regulations. If day t is the first day of a maintenance period or the first day of a quarter, the conditional mean for the Fed funds rate is specified as follows:
For all other days, the conditional mean of the Fed funds rate 3 is written as Table 2 and Table 3 . 4 Griffiths and Winters (1995) eliminate all settlement periods containing holidays and quarter-ends. However, U.S. holidays influence the way to calculate required reserves and to invest idle cash over the nontrading period the same as weekends. The last days of a quarter should be also included because some of the last days of a quarter coincided with the settlement Wednesday even though the heavy flow of funds is observed through the banking system ahead of the quarter end.
If the overnight Eurodollar rate is affected by the Fed funds rate, the overnight Eurodollar rate might be predictable on the basis of lagged Fed funds rates, lagged overnight Eurodollar rates and calendar days. The conditional mean of the overnight Eurodollar rate is estimated by two separate equations because the conditional mean of the Fed funds rate has different specifications depending on which day of a two-week reserve maintenance period day t corresponds to and whether day t is the first day of a quarter. On the first day of a maintenance period or the first day of a quarter, the following bivariate model gives the conditional mean of the overnight Eurodollar rate:
On other days, it is specified as 
The definitions of dummy variables, st d and jt h , are the same as those given in equations (4) and (5).
The spread t sp is treated as the residual variable in identity (1). Once the determinants of t i and t r , are specified, the conditional expectation for t sp is redundant and does not contain any additional information. The conditional mean of the spread can be calculated by equations (2) and (4) to (7). If there is no friction between or in the two markets and funds in the two markets are perfectly substitutable, the spread would not be predictable.
Because Sprindt and Hoffmeister (1988) , Griffiths and Winters (1995) and Hamilton (1996) showed that the Fed funds rate exhibited heteroskedasticity, the error terms of equations (4) to (7) are allowed to be heteroskedastic: Hamilton (1996) suggested. The innovation t v is drawn from a N(0,1) distribution with a probability p 13 and from a N(0, 2 τ ) distribution, which has a different variance, with a probability (1 p − ). The density of a mixture of two Normal distributions is
where θ is a vector of population parameters that includes p and 2 τ . The conditional variance of this distribution is given by
I followed Hamilton's (1996) modification of Nelson's (1991) exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model for the log of the conditional variance of t y . It is assumed that GARCH effects are integrated and s ξ has the same value for day 2 to day 7 in equation (12):
I also accept the hypothesis that the most important determinants of the conditional variance are the deviation of the log of the conditional variance from its unconditional expectation on the previous day and the average difference between the log of the conditional variance and its unconditional expectation during the previous two-week maintenance period (Hamilton, 1996) . Hence the log of the conditional variance is 
This function is differentiable everywhere including
. The expected value of
with the density of equation (9) with respect to 1
the conditional density of t y would be
is specified in equations (4) to (7). Hence the log of the density is
Maximum likelihood estimates are calculated by maximizing the conditional log likelihood with respect to the population parameters subject to two constraints, 1 0 ≤ ≤ p and 0 2 > τ .
Empirical Results
The maximum likelihood estimates 5 for the Fed funds rate and the overnight Eurodollar rate are reported in Tables 2 to 6 . If day t is the first day of a maintenance period or the first day of a quarter, then the conditional mean of the Fed funds rate is as follows: 
The hypothesis, 0 : Tables 2 and 3 respectively. The main patterns in Griffiths and Winters (1995) and Hamilton (1996) The lagged Fed funds rates can help predict the overnight Eurodollar rate on any day of a maintenance period. In part, it could be because yesterday's Fed funds rate was quoted in the U.S. after yesterday's Eurodollar rate was reported in London, so yesterday's Fed funds rate has more recent information than yesterday's Eurodollar rate.
The effect of lagged Fed funds rates on the overnight Eurodollar rate is larger for days other than the first day of a new period. In contrast, the lagged overnight Eurodollar rates help predict the Fed funds rate only on the first day of a new period. This result might show that the Fed funds rate influences the overnight Eurodollar rate more on days other than the first day of a new period. The second column of Tables 2 and 3 (20) and (21) (23) 8 , an AR(1) process can describe the conditional mean of the spread on a typical day: 
The value of the AR(1) coefficient is positive, meaning a positive correlation between t sp and 1 + t sp . If the difference between the overnight Eurodollar rate and the effective Fed funds rate is negative today, the difference is expected to be reduced but still negative tomorrow. The spread is predictable on the basis of yesterday's spread and dummy variables. Several papers have included lagged stock excess returns to estimate a stock excess return since discontinuous trading in the stocks makes up the index (Scholes and Williams, 1997; Lo and MacKinlay, 1988; and Nelson, 1991) . The Scholes and Williams (1997) model proposed an MA(1) process for index returns, while the Lo and MacKinlay (1988) and Nelson (1991) models suggested an AR(1) process. Canova and Marrinan (1995) empirically found that there is some weak positive serial correlation in excess returns between several financial markets but they failed to account for the serial correlation.
Equations (22) Tables 3 and 4 shows, the magnitudes of the calendar day effects on the conditional mean of the overnight Eurodollar rate are less than, or equal to those on the Fed funds rate. 9 The average positive effect of settlement Wednesday on the overnight Eurodollar rate is smaller than that on the Fed funds rate.
The downward pressure on the Fed funds rate does not appear on the overnight Eurodollar rate on the second Tuesday. This result is the same as Griffiths and Winters (1997) who found that government repos, which could be substitutes for Fed funds, did not show a significant decline on the second Tuesday but showed a significant increase on settlement Wednesday. The magnitude of the negative effect of Fridays is the same on the Fed funds rate and on the overnight Eurodollar rate but the positive effect of Mondays is bigger on the Fed funds rate. A negative weekend effect has been documented in U.S. stock prices (Fama, 1965; French, 1980; Gibbons and Hess, 1981; Harris, 1986; Lakonishok and Maberly, 1990) , in Treasury returns (Flannery and Protopapadakis, 1988) and in overnight repo rates (Griffiths and Winters, 1997) . Griffiths and Winters (1997) Maximum likelihood estimates for other parameters are presented in Table 6 . The innovation t v is assumed to be drawn from a mixture of two Normal distributions. About 83 percent of the Fed funds rate and the overnight Eurodollar rate are drawn from distribution 1, a Normal distribution with variance 1. With the probability of 0.17, t v of the Fed funds rate comes from N(0, 9.89). With the same probability, t v of the overnight Eurodollar rate is drawn from N(0, 11.7). They come from very similar distributions.
The overnight Eurodollar rate shows the same calendar day effects as the Fed funds rate with slightly smaller absolute magnitudes. The U.K. has a zero reserve requirement and U.K. banks must balance their position every day so the U.K reserve settlement system does not result in these empirical regularities. These empirical results give support to the theory that the calendar day effects on the overnight Eurodollar rate are caused by the characteristics in the Fed funds market. Because this paper analyzes the overnight Eurodollar rate between 7:00 am and 8:00 am EST which is observed earlier than the Fed funds rate in the U.S., the calendar day effects on the overnight Eurodollar rate may be smaller than those on the Fed funds rate even though the overnight Eurodollar rate has the same calendar day effect as the Fed funds rate if the two rates are rated at the same time. Griffiths and Winters (1995) show that the morning Fed funds rate tends to fall only in the first week of a maintenance period which is different from the afternoon Fed funds rate tendencies, using high and low bid rates. The empirical results in this paper do not rule out the possibility that the overnight Eurodollar rate and the Fed funds rate observed at the same time show the same calendar day effect and that their difference is not predictable on the basis of calendar days.
The main upward and downward tendencies of the Fed funds rate and the overnight Eurodollar rate are always the same in both overnight markets by arbitrage activities. requirements are another cost of funds to the purchasing bank to raise funds in the Eurodollar market. U.S. banks had to hold required reserves equal to 3 percent of net borrowings from the Euromarket until 1990. But the dummy variable for the period before 1990 is not significant as noted in footnote 3.
Even though there is the opportunity for arbitrage profits, there are three major reasons why U.S. banks are not actively out to make arbitrage profits. First, the primary job of a bank's Fed funds desk is that the bank holds no more excess reserves than the amount it can carry into the next settlement period and that the average rate it pays is lower than the effective Fed funds rate. Arbitrage transactions increase total profits but their low profitability often reduces the capital-asset ratio and the bank's average rate of return on assets, the critical financial ratios that measure capital adequacy and profitability. The Fed funds desk is looking for the cheapest available source of funds.
At most major banks, the Fed funds desk is managed conservatively and they do not try to make money by dealing aggressively in funds (Stigum, 1990) . Evidence of conservative management is that excess reserves are consistently positive. Second, the funds in the two markets have limited substitutability due to market frictions caused by the heterogeneity of banks. One factor on which banks are heterogeneous is creditworthiness. Different banks borrow funds at different rates depending on their creditworthiness of the borrower, general market conditions, and other factors. that will sell funds to large banks, the large banks have to buy at the arranged rate whatever sums these banks offer even though they do not need to buy these funds. A bank may have to pay higher rates than the market rate because while funds are still offered in the market, they are not offered by banks with lines open to it. By the same token a bank posting noncompetitive rates may still pick up deposits either because the lender has a line to only a few banks or because his lines to other banks are full. Third, the bid-asked spread prohibits the Fed funds desk from taking the arbitrage profit.
Generally either 1/16 or 1/8 of a percentage point, equivalent to 6 or 12.5 basis points, separates the bid from the offer. The bid-asked spread is very big compared to the average difference between the overnight Eurodollar rate in London and the effective Fed funds rate, which is about 8 basis points. The spread can widen by several percentage points due to illiquidity or uncertainty. The spread may also be much smaller due to market conditions. Because of these reasons, the cost of using the knowledge of the predictable differential would outweigh the potential gain. A bank may be unwilling to pursue arbitrage except at a substantially enhanced spread.
Conclusion
There are a number of depository institutions which are free to trade funds in sufficient size in the Fed funds market and in the overnight Eurodollar market.
Therefore, the Fed funds rate and the overnight Eurodollar rate are closely linked and the calendar day effects appear in both the overnight Eurodollar rate and in the Fed funds rate. However, the absolute magnitude of the calendar day effects on the overnight Eurodollar rate is slightly smaller than those on the Fed funds rate. The day-of-amaintenance-period effect and the U.S. holiday effect on the overnight Eurodollar rate is produced by characteristics in the Fed funds market, such as line limits, overnight overdraft penalties, transaction costs and weekend accounting conventions.
The differences between the Fed funds rate and the overnight Eurodollar rate can be predicted on the basis of lagged Fed funds rates, lagged overnight Eurodollar rates and calendar day dummies. Because of costs other than the interest rates, a bank which would expect the positive or negative spread does not or could not take arbitrage strategy. worthwhile to pay a higher interest rate on a London dollar deposit than on a Paris dollar deposit if the funds are to be used to finance a purchase of a loan in New York. Occasionally, however, the branch in a particular country may offer a somewhat higher interest rate to compensate for a depositor's reluctance to buy deposits in that country because of greater political risk (Aliber, 1980) .
The overnight London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) would be a better measure to use because the LIBOR is a benchmark rate in the Euromarket as well as in other financial markets.
However the British Bankers' Association did not publish the overnight LIBOR before January
2001.
2 The differential between the Fed funds rate and the overnight Eurodollar rate may signal changes in political risks. Because the two funds are traded overnight, the political risk would be very small. The estimated conditional mean for equations (4) 
